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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE SYSTEM AFTER
THE NORTHERN PIPELINE DECISION
I. INTRODUCTION
Article III, section I of the United States Constitution provides that
[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress will
from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Office during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Contin-
uance in Office.1
Although Congress did not have to create inferior courts,2 once it chose
to do so it was bound by the constraints of article III to provide the judges of
those courts with life tenure and freedom from salary diminution.3 The
Supreme Court, however, has identified three categories of inferior courts
which are exempt from the requirements of article III: military tribunals;
adjuncts to article III courts; and legislative courts created pursuant to arti-
cle I.
4
1. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
2. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-5 (1978).
3. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 42-43 (2d
ed. 1983).
4. See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50 (1982).
Military courts "involve a constitutional grant of power that has been histori-
cally understood as giving the political branches of Government extraordinary con-
trol over the precise subject matter at issue" and, hence, are not to be considered
under the dominion of article III. Id. at 66.
Adjuncts to article III courts must be such that "the essential attributes ofjudi-
cial power" rest within the article III court. Id. at 81. This has been interpreted to
mean that the litigant has a right to de novo review of any objections to the finding of
the adjunct tribunal. See, e.g., United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980). For a
discussion of Raddatz, see notes 57-59 and accompanying text 'nfra. For a discussion of
de novo review, see notes 52-59 and accompanying text uhfra.
The doctrine of article I legislative courts is derived from Chief justice Mar-
shall's opinion in the American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
In allowing non-article III judges to render a decision in what was then the territory
of Florida, Chief Justice Marshall stated:
They are legislative Courts, created in virtue of the general right of sover-
eignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which
enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the
territory belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with which they
are invested, is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d
article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress, in the execution of
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In response to caseload pressure burdening the federal courts, 5 Congress
has drawn upon these exemptions to create federal bankruptcy courts6 and
to expand the judicial power of United States Magistrates. 7 The federal
bankruptcy courts, established through the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
(Reform Act)8 are staffed by judges who serve fourteen year terms9 and have
only statutory salary protections. 10 The magistrate system, as amended by
Section 636(c) of the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979,11 provides a method
Id. at 546.
Subsequently this doctrine was limited in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,
531 (1962), after Congress had specifically designated the United States Court of
Claims as an article III court in contravention of previous Supreme Court rulings.
Glidden involved two cases, one, a civil action and the other a criminal action, in
which there were questions as to whether the judges presiding over the actions were
given article III protection. Id. at 535. Two judges who were assigned judicial duties
in the district court by the Chief Justice were from the Court of Claims and the
Court of Customs and Patents Appeals, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 293(a), 294(b) Id. at
532 & nn.2-3 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 293(a), 294(b) (1982)). Previously the Court of
Claims had been considered an article I legislative court but the Supreme Court
accepted Congress' redesignation of its status to that of an article III court and, thus,
allowed the assignment. Id. at 584.
5. See H.R. REP. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4252, 4256-57.
6. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, §§ 201(a), 233(a), 241(a), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 151-160, 771-775, 1471-1482 (1982). For a discussion of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, see notes 26-30 and accompanying text ihfia.
7. See Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, § 101, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1982). Further
expansion of jurisdiction was given to United States magistrates in 1978 to reduce
case backlogs. Seejurisdction of the United States Magistrates." Hearings on S 1283 before
the Subcomm. on Improvements inJudicial Machiney of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975). The Federal Magistrates Act of 1979 extended the magis-
trate's power in order to increase the efficiency and flexibility of the magistrate sys-
tem. S. REP. No. 74, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprnted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1469, 1472. For a discussion of the evolution of the magistrate system, see
notes 31-47 and accompanying text infra.
8. 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-160, 771-775, 1471-1482 (1982).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
11. Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, § 101, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1982). Section
636(c) provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary-
(1) Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time magistrate or a part-
time United States magistrate who serves as a full-time judicial officer may
conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order
the entry of judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise
such jurisdiction over the court or courts he serves . . . . When there is
more than one judge of a district court, designation under this paragraph
shall be by the concurrence of a majority of all the judges of such district
court, and when there is no such concurrence, then by the chief judge.
(2) If a magistrate is designated to exercise civil jurisdiction under
paragraph (1) of this subsection, the clerk of court shall, at the time the
action is filed, notify the parties of their right to consent to the exercise of
such jurisdiction. The decision of the parties shall be communicated to the
clerk of court. Thereafter, neither the district judge nor the magistrate shall
attempt to persuade or induce any party to consent to reference of any civil
[Vol. 29: p. 745
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whereby federal magistrates, who are appointed for eight year terms,1 2 may,
with the consent of the parties, 13 conduct entire civil trials and enter judg-
ments. Both the bankruptcy court and the magistrate system have raised
constitutional questions concerning the creation of non-article III
tribunals. 14
In 1982, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the bank-
ruptcy courts in Northern Pipehne Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Lie Co.,
15
where the Court, in a sharply divided opinion, 16 held that the non-article III
judges of the bankruptcy court could not constitutionally exercise at least
part of the jurisdiction vested in them by the Reform Act. 17 The Supreme
Court's discussion of broad article III questions pertaining to the bankruptcy
courts 1 has prompted questions concerning the legitimacy of section 636(c)
matter to a magistrate. Rules of court . . . shall include procedures to pro-
tect the voluntariness of the parties' consent.
(3) Upon entry of judgment in any case referred under paragraph (1)
of this subsection, an aggrieved party may appeal directly to the appropri-
ate United States court of appeals from the judgment of the magistrate in
the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of a district court.
In this circumstance, the consent of the parties allows a magistrate desig-
nated to exercise civil jurisdiction under paragraph (1) of this subsection to
direct the entry of a judgment of the district court in accordance with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Nothing in this paragraph shall be con-
strued as a limitation of any party's right to seek review by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (3) of this subsec-
tion, at the time of reference to a magistrate, the parties may further con-
sent to appeal on the record to a judge of the district court in the same
manner as on an appeal from a judgment of the district court to a court of
appeals. Wherever possible the local rules of the district court and the rules
promulgated by the conference shall endeavor to make such appeal expedi-
tious and inexpensive. The district court may affirm, reverse, modify, or
remand the magistrate's judgment.
Id. § 636(c).
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 631(e) (1982).
13. See id. § 636(c). For the text of § 636(c), see note 11 supra.
14. For a discussion of the constitutional questions raised by the bankruptcy
court and the magistrate system, see notes 48-51 and accompanying text ihfra.
15. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). For a discussion of Northern Pipeline, see notes 60-77 and
accompanying text infra.
16. Justice Brennan, speaking for a plurality of four Justices, announced the
judgment of the Court. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred
separately. Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Powell, dissented.
The Chief Justice also filed a brief separate dissent.
17. Northern PA'e/ine, 458 U.S. at 87.
18. Northern Pipeline presented only the question of whether a non-article III
bankruptcy judge could constitutionally hear a state-created cause of action involv-
ing the debtor. 458 U.S. at 87 n.40. The Court, however, found the vast jurisdic-
tional grants to bankruptcy judges to be unseverable, and, therefore, held the entire
jurisdictional provision to be unconstitutional. Id.
The plurality never decided the initially presented question of whether Congress
could allow a non-article III court to hear bankruptcy cases at all. The Chief Justice
in his dissent characterized the Court's holding as limited to the following
proposition:
3
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of the Magistrates Act which allows a magistrate, upon consent of the par-
ties, to enter final judgment. 19
Recently, the Third Circuit addressed this issue in Wharton-Thomas v.
UnitedStates,20 and found that the consent procedure of section 636(c) prop-
erly distinguished the Magistrate procedure from the improper delegation of
the bankruptcy courts. 2 1 After first providing an historical perspective, this
note will discuss the Third Circuit's analysis, concluding that the court prop-
erly found section 636(c) constitutional.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
MAGISTRATES SYSTEM
A. The Bankruptcy Courts
Since 1898 there has been a federal bankruptcy law which authorized
federal tribunals, on petition of either a distressed debtor or his creditors, to
distribute the debtor's available assets to his creditors and ultimately dis-
charge him from debt liability. 22 Exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy
cases was in the federal district courts which, pursuant to congressional au-
thorization, would appoint bankruptcy referees to make initial recommenda-
tions subject to district court review. 2 3 The status and authority of the
bankruptcy referee was enhanced by the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,
a "traditional" state common law action, not made subject to a federal rule
of decision, and related only peripherally to an adjudication of bankruptcy
under federal law, must, absent the consent of the litigants, be heard by an
"Article III court" if it is to be heard by any court or agency of the United
States.
Id. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
19. For the text of§ 636(c), see note 11 supra. In light of the discussion in North-
ern Pipeline concerning the limits of non-article III tribunals, questions have arisen
concerning the jurisdiction of federal administrative agencies. See Redish, Legislative
Courts, Administrative Agencis, and the Northern Pipeline Deciston, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197.
20. 721 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1983).
21. Id. at 923.
22. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898). The Constitution
gives Congress the power to "establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankrupt-
cies." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
23. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doe. No. 137, Pt. 1, 93rd Cong., 1st. Sess. 1, 94 (1973) (here-
inafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT). In discussing proposed changes in the bank-
ruptcy system, the Report stated,
In all prior bankruptcy legislation the direct responsibility for supervising
the administration of bankruptcy cases has been reposed by Congress in
district judges or their appointees. The assumption underlying the Acts of
1867 and 1898 was that while the judges of the circuit and district courts
were vested with jurisdiction over the administration of all cases filed and
pending in their courts and of most of the controversies generated by them,
the registers or referees should assume most of the burdens imposed by this
class of cases. The judges were intended to exercise a supervisory role which
was largely undefined but which was exemplified in the statutory provisions
for . . . the review of their orders.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 29: p. 745
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promulgated in 1973,24 though the district court was still left with the right
to withdraw a case from the referee and to review the referee's
determination.
2 5
With the Bankruptcy Reform Act in 1978, Congress made significant
substantive and procedural changes in the bankruptcy system. 26 Two major
goals of the new legislation were to enlarge the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court and to increase its independence.2 7 The court's new jurisdiction in-
cluded "all civil proceedings arising under . ..or related to a case arising
under" the federal bankruptcy law.2 8 To increase the independence of the
bankruptcy court the Reform Act granted the bankruptcy court, with only
minor exceptions, 29 all "the powers of a court of equity, law, and admi-
ralty." The bankruptcy court, therefore, was given the power to hold jury
24. See id. "The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure were promulgated by the
Supreme Court during the years 1973-76 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075 [1982] and
were published in the United States Code immediately following Title 11." See Ken-
nedy, The Bankruptcy Court Under the New Bankruptcy Law. Its Structure, Jurisdiction,
Venue, and Procedure, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 251, 253 n.10 (1979). "The Rules remain
effective under the Bankruptcy Code to the extent not inconsistent with the Code
until repealed or superceded by rules promulgated pursuant to the congressional en-
abling act as amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 247, 92
Stat. 2672 (1978)." Id.
25. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 53 (citing Bankr. R. 102, 801 (superseded by
statute)).
26. 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-160, 771-775, 1471-1482 (1982) (effective April 1, 1984).
For a discussion of the Act prior to the decision in Northern Ppeline, see Eisen &
Smurtnik, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978-An Elevated ]udiciay, 28 DE PAUL L.
REV. 1007 (1979); Kennedy, supra note 24, at 251; Note, The Questionable Constitutional-
ity of Article I Bankruptcy Courts, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 733 (1982).
27. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 53. See Note, supra note 26, at 734-36.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 147 1(b) (1982). If a case which falls within the jurisdictional
grant is not filed originally in the bankruptcy court, it may be removed to the bank-
ruptcy court. 28 U.S.C. § 1478 (1982). The grant ofjurisdiction became effective on
October 1, 1979.
Civil proceedings related to cases arising under bankruptcy law include contro-
versies that could have only been determined in plenary proceedings in state or fed-
eral districts courts before the Reform Act. See H.REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
445 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6400. The ex-
panded jurisdiction eliminated this summary/plenary distinction in order to provide
a forum capable of quickly and uniformly resolving all disputes that affect a given
debtor. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5803-04. Thus, if a debtor has common law claims against
a third party while undergoing bankruptcy proceedings, the new jurisdiction would
allow the bankruptcy court to hear and determine those claims. See Northern Pitxehne,
458 U.S. at 54.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982). The courts
are given power to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions" of proposed title 11. The pro-
posed bankruptcy courts will be able to enforce their own orders, and to
issue writs of execution in aid of enforcement. The grant of the power to
issue writs of habeaus corpus to release debtors imprisoned on dischargable
debts is explicit.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 28, at 12, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5973 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1982)).
1983-84]
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trials, issue declaratory judgments, issue writs of habeas corpus, and issue
any order or judgment necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act.
30
B. The Federal Magistrate System
The federal magistrate system developed from the practice of using
United States commissioners to assist the federal judiciary. 3' As early as
1789, the federal judiciary was assisted by these commissioners. 32 Then in
1968, Congress passed the Federal Magistrate Act 33 which abolished their
office and established a system of United States magistrates.34 The Act
grants magistrates fixed terms of office 35 at fixed salaries36 and provides that
their responsibilities include all powers and duties previously conferred or
imposed upon United States commissioners. 37 Magistrates are also to serve
as special masters pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure38 and
30. 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1480, 1651, 2201, 2256 (1982).
31. McCabe, The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 343, 345-
51 (1979). Beginning in 1789, commissioners would assist the judicial branch by per-
forming various duties including the setting of bail for federal crimes. Id. By 1940,
Congress had extended the commissioners' jurisdiction to try all petty offenses com-
mitted on property under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of the federal gov-
ernment provided the district court specifically designated the exercise of such
jurisdiction. Id. For a general discussion of the establishment of United States magis-
trates, see Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part II" The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1297 (1975); Comment, An Adjudicative Role for Federal Magistrates in Civil
Cases, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 584 (1973); Note, Article III Constraints and the Expanding Civil
Jurisdiction of Federal Magistrates- A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023 (1979).
32. McCabe, supra note 31, at 345.
33. Pub. L. No. 90-578, § 101, 82 Stat. 1113 (1968) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 636 (1982)).
34. H.R. REP. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4252, 4253-54. The Act sought to "reform the first echelon of the
Federal judiciary into an effective component of a modern scheme of justice ....
Id.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 63 1(e) (1982). Section 63 1(e) provides: "The appointment of
any individual as a full-time magistrate shall be for a term of eight years, and the
appointment of any individuals as a part-time magistrate shall be for a term of four
years . . . " Id.
36. Id. § 634(a). Section 634(a) provides:
Officers appointed under this chapter shall receive as full compensa-
tion for their services salaries to be fixed by the conference pursuant to sec-
tion 633 of this title, at rates for full-time and part-time United States
magistrates not to exceed the rates now or hereafter provided for full-time
and part-time referees in bankruptcy, respectively, referred to in section 40a
of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. 68(a)), as amended, except the salary of a
part-time United States magistrate shall not be less than $100 nor more
than one-half the maximum salary payable to a full-time magistrate.
Id.
37. Id. § 636(a)(1). Section 636(a)(1) provides that each United Stated Magis-
trate shall have within the territorial jurisdiction prescribed by his appointment "all
powers and duties conferred or imposed upon United States commissioners by law or
by the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts . . . ... Id.
38. Id. § 636(b)(2). Section 636(b)(2) provides that notwithstanding any law to
the contrary,
6
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assist district judges in pretrial and discovery proceedings. 39 Moreover, the
Act provides magistrates with authority to perform "such additional duties
as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United
States."
40
Because of an increasing backlog in federal district courts4' and the im-
plementation of the Speedy Trial Act,42 Congress amended the Magistrate
[a] judge may designate a magistrate to serve as a special master pursu-
ant to the applicable provisions of this title and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for the United States district courts. A judge may designate a
magistrate to serve as a special master in any civil case, upon consent of the
parties without regard to the provisions of rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure for the United States district courts.
Id.
39. Id. § 636(b)(1). Section 636(b)(1)(A) provides that
a judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pretrial mat-
ter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for judg-
ment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an
indictment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a
criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to
involuntarily dismiss an action.
Id. § 636(b)(1)(A).
Section 636(b)(1)(B) provides that
a judge may also designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, including evi-
dentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings
of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of
any motion excepted in subparagraph (A), of applications for post-trial re-
lief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner peti-
tioners challenging conditions of confinement.
Id. § 636(b)(1)(B).
40. Id. § 636(b)(3). Responsibility for overseeing the administration of the mag-
istrate system was given to the Judicial Conference of the United States. See 1.
§ 633(b). The Judicial Conference consists of the Chief Justice of the United States,
the chief judge of each judicial circuit, the chief judge of the Court of Claims, the
chief judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and a district judge from
each judicial circuit chosen by the district and circuit judges at the annual conference
to serve for three years. See id. § 331. The Conference's duties include the determina-
tion of number, type, location, and salary of each United States magistrate position.
Id. § 633(b).
41. McCabe, supra note 31, at 353. Cf ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1-2 to 1-3 (1974);
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 1-3 to 1-4 (1973); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS I-I to 1-2 (1972). As
well as increases in normal business, Congress was passing new legislation creating
new federal causes of action and giving greater access to the federal courts. McCabe,
supra note 31, at 353 n.55 (citing Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982);
Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678, (1982); Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982); Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691(f) (1982) (as amended); Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a-1681t (1982); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2051-2081 (1982)).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1982). The Speedy Trial Act increased existing pressure
on the court docket by imposing strict deadlines and requirements of proceedings in
federal criminal cases. See id.
1983-84]
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Act in 1976. 4 3 This legislation added more specificity to the scope of assist-
ance which magistrates could provide the judiciary including assistance in
pretrial proceedings in civil and criminal cases.
4 4
Further amendments were added in 1979 in an attempt to assist the
poor in getting their cases to trial more quickly and to add flexibility to the
magistrate system.45 The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 extended the mag-
istrate's power to dispose of certain minor criminal cases, 4 6 and granted, in
section 636, the power to enter final judgment without the opportunity for de
43. Jursdiction of the United States Magistrates: Hearings on S 1283 Before the Sub-
comm. on Improvement in Judicial Machineg of the Senate Comm. on theJudtclav, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1975).
44. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1982); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3402 (1982). The 1976
amendments were designed to eliminate the confusion caused by courts giving both
restrictive and expansive interpretations of what could properly be delegated through
the "additional duties" provision of the Act. See Comment, An Expandtig Civil Role for
United States Magistrates, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 66, 82-83 (1976). Courts have invalidated
on statutory grounds a wide range of duties under previous law. See, e.g., Wedding v.
Wingo, 483 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1973), affd, 418 U.S. 461 (1974) (evidentiary hearings
in a habeas corpus proceeding); TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972)
(motion to dismiss a civil case). For the text of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)-(2), see notes
38-39 supra.
Other courts have upheld the referral to magistrates of an equally wide variety
of cases under the pertinent statutes. See McCabe, supra note 31, at 351 n.45 (citing
Campbell v. United States Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
879 (1974) (motion to suppress evidence in a criminal case); Givens v. W.T. Grant
Co., 457 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 409 U.S. 56 (1972) (motion to
dismiss a civil case); Asparro v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Conn. 1973)
(evidentiary hearings in habeas corpus cases)).
Since the different holdings were due only to statutory interpretation, the 1976
law affirmed the broad range of duties which were already being performed by mag-
istrates in an attempt to put them on a more uniform basis nationally. See H.R. REP.
No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976). The codified version of these duties is at 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1982), the text of which can be found at note 39 supra.
45. S. REP. No. 74, supra note 7, at 4, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 1472. The amendment recognized the growing interest in improving access
to the courts for all groups, especially the less advantaged since the latter lack the
resources to cope with the vicissitudes of adjudication delay and expense. Id. This
outcome may be more pronounced as the exigencies of the Speedy Trial Act increase
the demands on the federal courts. Id. The amendments to the magistrate system are
thought to be able to help the federal judiciary cope with the mounting queue of civil
cases pushed to the back of the docket. Id. Increased flexibility would be added by
the limited tenure of magistrates. Id. Magistrate positions can be selectively placed
by the Judicial Conference to accommodate surges of litigation in particular districts
at particular times. Id.
46. Id. at 5-6, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1474. The
United States magistrates were previously empowered to try persons accused of mi-
nor offenses for which the maximum penalty that may be imposed does not exceed
imprisonment for a term of one year or a fine of $1,000, or both (with certain limited
exceptions), if the defendant consents to trial before a magistrate rather than before a
district judge, and if the defendant waives whatever right to trial by jury he may
have. Id.
The 1979 Act expanded the magistrate's criminal trial jurisdiction to include
any misdemeanor prosecuted in the federal district court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3401
(1982).
8
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novo review where the parties to the litigation consent.4 7
III. QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
A. Introduction
The bankruptcy court and the magistrate system have raised constitu-
tional questions concerning the delegation of article III judicial power to
non-article III judges.48 Article III judges are to hold their office during
good behavior 4 9 and may not have their compensation diminished during
their continuance in office. 50 Bankruptcy judges and magistrates, however,
have fixed terms of office and are only statutorily protected from salary
diminution.
5 1
Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the constitutionality of
using referees rested upon the opportunity for de novo review in the district
court. 5 2 Similarly, prior to the adoption of the Federal Magistrate Act of
1979, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of non-article III tribunals
staffed by federal magistrates, on the basis that the tribunals' decisions were
subject to de novo review by an article III court.5 3 In Mathews v. Weber,5 4 the
47. S. REP. No. 74, supra note 7, at 4, reprinted bn 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 1473. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1982). For the text of a § 636(c), see note 11
supra.
48. See S. REP. No. 74, supra note 7, at 4-6, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 1973-75. For a discussion of the exceptions to the article III require-
ment, see note 4 supra. For a discussion of the constitutional questions raised by the
Magistrate Act and the 1976 amendments, see McCabe, supra note 31, at 365; Com-
ment, supra note 44, at 80-82; Comment, supra note 31, at 587-88.
49. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. "Good Behavior" has always been taken to mean
tenure for life, with removal only through the impeachment standard in art. II, § 4.
See, e.g., O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1933).
50. U.S. CONST. art. III, §1.
51. For the statutory language fixing a magistrate's salary and term in office, see
notes 35-36 supra. The magistrate's salary cannot be reduced during the term of of-
fice. 28 U.S.C. § 634(b) (1982). Magistrates serve eight year terms and neither full-
time nor part-time magistrates may be removed from office except for "incompe-
tency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability" as found by a
majority of the judges of the district. Id. § 631(i).
Bankruptcy judges are to be appointed by the President, with the consent of the
Senate, to fourteen year terms. Id. §§ 152, 153(a). Bankruptcy judges are subject to
removal by the judicial conference for the same reasons that warrant removal of
magistrates. Id. § 153(b).
52. H.R. REP. No. 1609, supra note 44, at 3-4.
53. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) (statute calls for de novo
determination, not de novo review); Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976) (prelimi-
nary review of social security cases by a magistrate is an "additional duty" under the
statute). Under the magistrate system this requirement was codified in § 636(b)(1),
which states:
Within ten days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and
file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as
provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo deter-
mination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommenda-
1983-84)
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Supreme Court found constitutional the practice of referring all social secur-
ity benefit cases to magistrates for preliminary review. 55 The Court stressed
the fact that magistrates do no more than give recommendations; "[t]he au-
thority-and the responsibility-to make an informed, final determination,
we emphasize, remains with the judge." 56 The Court allowed further expan-
sion of the role of magistrates in United States v. Raddatz.5 7 In Raddatz, the
Court reviewed the statutory question of whether a de novo determination of
a magistrate's finding required the court to rehear testimony in order to
make an independent evaluation of credibility. 58 The Supreme Court held
that since the statute called for a de novo determination and not a de novo
hearing, the court did not have to rehear the testimony upon which the mag-
istrate based his findings and recommendations.
59
B. The Northern Pipeline Decision
The Bankruptcy Reform Act, however, does not provide for de novo re-
view and, therefore, has raised important article III objections. 60 The
tions made by the magistrate. The judge may also receive further evidence
or recommit the matter to the magistrate with instructions.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1982).
54. 423 U.S. 261 (1976).
55. Id. at 270-72. In Weber, the plaintiff wished to challenge the final determina-
tion that he was not entitled to reimbursement under the Medicare provisions of the
Social Security Act. Id. at 263. The clerk of the court, pursuant to a court rule for
social security cases, assigned the case to a magistrate "to notice and conduct such
factual hearings and legal argument as may be appropriate" and to "prepare a pro-
posed written order or decision, together with proposed findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law where necessary or appropriate. ... Id. at 263-64. The Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare moved to vacate the order of reference, but the mo-
tion was denied. Id. at 265.
56. Id. at 271.
57. 447 U.S. 667 (1980). In Raddatz, the defendant, prior to his trial on federal
criminal charges, moved to suppress certain incriminating statements he had made.
Id. at 669. Over the defendant's objections, the district court referred the motion to a
magistrate for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to the Federal Magistrates Act, 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1982). Id. For the text of § 636(b)(1)(B), see note 39 supra.
The magistrate, after hearing evidence and testimony, recommended that the motion
be denied. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 671. The district court accepted his recommendation
over the defendant's objections without hearing the testimony. Id. at 671-72.
58. 447 U.S. at 672-73. The Court focused on statutory interpretation, rejecting
the constitutional challenges. Id. at 673-76.
59. Id. at 673-76. The Ninth Circuit has held that the de novo determination
cannot simply be a pro forma approval. See Coolidge v. Schooner California, 637
F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1020 (1981). In Coohdge, the district
court, without considering the objections of the parties, accepted the magistrate's
opinion as the court's "findings of fact and conclusions of law." Id. at 1323. The
Ninth Circuit overturned the district court's judgment and held that the Magistrates
Act required the judge to reexamine any findings as to which the litigants had objec-
tion. Id. at 1327.
60. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 53. The Act establishes a special procedure
for appeal from orders of bankruptcy courts. Id. at 55. The circuit council is empow-
ered to direct the chief judge of the circuit to designate panels of three bankruptcy
judges to hear appeals. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 160 (1982)). These panels have juris-
[Vol. 29: p. 745
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Supreme Court addressed these objections in Northern Pipe/hne Construction Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Lte Co.6 1 A plurality of the Court held that section 241(a)
of the Reform Act was unconstitutional because the broad grant of jurisdic-
tion to bankruptcy judges "impermissibly removed most, if not all, of 'the
essential attributes of the judicial powers' from the Art[icle] III district
Court," and vested those powers in a non-article III bankruptcy court.
62
Northern Pipeline dealt with the question of whether non-article III bank-
ruptcy courts could constitutionally adjudicate state-created common law
rights which involve the debtor.63 Northern Pipeline Construction Com-
pany filed for reorganization under the Reform Act and subsequently filed
suit in the bankruptcy court against Marathon Pipe Line Company for a
variety of common law claims.64 Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality,
considered the constitutionality of the broad jurisdictional grants under the
Reform Act and their relationship to the jurisdictional limits on non-article
III courts.
65
The plurality first discussed the principles of article III, section 1, which
requires that federal judges have life tenure and freedom from salary dimi-
nution, and the importance of these provisions to the framers of the Consti-
tution.66 In finding that bankruptcy court judges lack these essential
protections, the plurality went on to consider possible saving provisions.
67
Justice Brennan discussed the three exceptions to the article III requirements
recognized by the court: military courts; legislative courts; and adjuncts to
article III courts. 68 The plurality found that Congress did not establish the
bankruptcy courts as military courts or as legislative courts. 69 Moreover,
diction over all appeals from final judgments, orders, and decrees of bankruptcy
courts, and, with leave of the panel, over interlocutory appeals. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1482 (1982)). If no such appellate panel is established, then the district court
would be empowered to exercise appellate jurisdiction. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1334
(1982)). The court of appeals is given jurisdiction over appeals from either the panel
or the district court. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1293 (1982)). Should the parties agree, a
direct appeal to the court of appeals may be taken from a final judgment of a bank-
ruptcy court. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1293(b) (1982)).
61. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
62. Id. at 87.
63. Id. at 56, 84-85.
64. Id. at 56. Northern Pipeline filed suit seeking damages for an alleged breach
of warranty, as well as for misrepresentation, coercion, and duress. Id.
65. Id. at 54. Justice Brennan began the plurality opinion by framing the issue
as "whether the assignment by the Congress to bankruptcy judges of the jurisdiction
granted in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 . . . by § 241(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, violates
Art. III of the Constitution." Id. at 53. The jurisdiction provision to which Justice
Brennan referred describes the entire jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts and is not
limited to the joining of a common law claim to the bankruptcy proceeding. See 28
U.S.C. § 1471 (1982).
66. 458 U.S. at 57-60. For a discussion of the importance of this provision to the
framers of the Constitution, see note 147 infra.
67. 458 U.S. at 60-62.
68. Id. at 63-77. For a discussion of the three exceptions to the requirements of
article III, see note 4 supra.
69. 458 U.S. at 63-66. For a discussion of legislative courts, see note 4 supra.
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Justice Brennan stated that only in the face of an exceptional grant of power
by the Constitution to Congress "has the Court declined to hold the author-
ity of Congress subject to the general prescriptions of Art[icle] III." The
Court discerned no such exceptional grant of power applicable in the case
before it.
70
The plurality also rejected the argument that the bankruptcy court was
merely an "adjunct" to the district court because the Reform Act failed to
retain "the essential attributes of judicial power" in an article III court.
7 1
While the plurality opinion discussed broad article III questions regard-
ing the bankruptcy courts, the concurring opinion of Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Justice O'Conner, was limited to the situation before the court.
72
The concurrence concluded that a traditional state common law action must
be heard by an article III court because it related only peripherally to an
adjudication of bankruptcy under federal law. 73 Since the concurring jus-
70. 458 U.S. at 70.
71. Id. at 84-85. Having concluded that the broad grant of jurisdiction to the
bankruptcy courts contained in § 241(a) is unconstitutional, the plurality did not
apply the decision retroactively. Id. at 87-88. Its decision rested upon three consider-
ations: the Act was not clearly foreshadowed by earlier cases; retroactive application
would not further the operation of the holdings; and retroactive application could
produce substantial inequitable results in individual cases. Id. at 88.
72. Id. at 89 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The concurring Justices stated that
Marathon had not been subjected to the full range of authority granted bankruptcy
courts in § 241(a) but was simply a named defendant in a contract suit initiated by
the appellant, Northern Pipeline, after having previously filed a petition for reorgani-
zation under the Bankruptcy Act. Id.
73. Id. In reaction to the holding in Northern peline, the Judicial Conference for
the United States urged adoption of local rules for the processing of bankruptcy
cases. Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilgham Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 199 (3d Cir.
1983). To that end, the Judicial Conference, on September 23, 1982, passed a resolu-
tion proposing an interim rule to insure the continued operation of the bankruptcy
system pending Congressional action to cure the Constitutional infirmity of 28
U.S.C. § 1471. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc. v. Central Transport, Inc., 726 F.2d 93, 95 (3d
Cir. 1984).
Local Rule 47 of the District Court for the District of New Jersey, pursuant to a
directive of the Third Circuit Judicial Council, provides one example of a court
tracking the resolution of the conference by providing that
[o]rders and judgments of bankruptcy judges in civil proceedings related to
cases arising under Title 11, but not arising in or under Title 11, or wher-
ever otherwise constitutionally required, judgments as defined in Rule 54(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which would be appealable if ren-
dered by a district judge and which do not result from a stipulation among
the parties, shall not be effective and shall not be entered until the judg-
ment has been signed by a district judge.
Coastal Steel, 709 F.2d at 199.
In an attempt to cure the constitutional infirmities of § 1471, Congress passed
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-
353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 151-158, 1334, 1408-1412, 1452, 1930). Title I of the Act created a new bank-
ruptcy court arrangement whereby bankruptcy judges act as article I adjuncts to
federal district courts in the resolution of core bankruptcy proceedings. See id. Ac-
cordingly, "the district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases
under Title 11" and "original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings
[Vol. 29: p. 745
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tices found the jurisdictional grants to the bankruptcy courts inseverable,
they concurred fully in the result.1
4
Justice White, with whom the Chief Justice and Justice Powell joined,
dissented on the grounds that the doctrine of article I legislative courts
should be extended to federal bankruptcy proceedings. 75 The dissent
strongly emphasized the need to better define this area of law.
76
Chief Justice Burger, while joining in the dissent, wrote a separate opin-
ion to emphasize that the holding of Northern Pipeline was limited to that
suggested in the concurring opinion of Justice Rehnquist.
7 7
C. Northern Pipeline's Posstble Efect on the Magistrate System
The decision in Northern Pipeline raised doubts as to the constitutionality
of the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979.78 Using the strict interpretation of
article III urged by Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in relation to the
bankruptcy court, a court could find that the Magistrate Act, by permitting
a magistrate to conduct civil trials and enter judgment upon consent of the
litigants, is also unconsitutional.
79
The legislative history of the Magistrate Act of 1979 indicates that a
majority of Congress believed that the Act would be constitutional because it
required that any reference be with the consent of the parties.80 Congres-
sional confidence in the Act stemmed from the belief that the article III
tenure and salary requirements are due process protections insuring the in-
arising under Title 11, or arising in or related to cases under Title 11." Id. § 101(a),
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) at 333 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(a), (b)). To further ensure the constitutionality of the bankruptcy system, the
district court is to abstain from hearing all cases related to a case under Title 11 if the
"action could not have been commenced in a court of the United States absent juris-
diction in this section" and an appropriate state forum is available. Id. (to be codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2)). Furthermore, the district court may withdraw in
whole or in part any case it has referred to the bankruptcy court. Id. § 104(a), 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) at 341 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(d)). The Supreme Court has yet to review the constitutionality of this act.
74. Northern Pt'pehne, 458 U.S. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 93 (White, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 92-93 (White, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
78. See Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922, 925 (3d Cir. 1983). See
also McCabe, supra note 31, at 365-79; Silberman, supra note 31, at 1305-18; Com-
ment, supra note 31, at 587-94; Note, supra note 31, at 1030-63.
79. See Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am. v. Instromedix, Inc., 712 F.2d 1305
(9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 725 F.2d 537, (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
80. S. REP. No. 74, supra note 7, at 4, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 1473. The Senate Report stated:
The bill makes clear that the voluntary consent of the parties is required
before any civil action may be referred to a magistrate. In light of this
requirement of consent, no witness at the hearings on the bill found any
constitutional question that could be raised against the provision. Near
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dependence of the judge, which, like any other due process right, can be
waived by a knowing and intelligent consent. 81 Strong emphasis was placed
by the Senate Judiciary Committee on the requirement that "no pressure,
tacit or expressed, should be applied to the litigants to induce them to con-
sent to trial before the magistrates.
'82
A few congressmen did not, however, find these measures sufficient, ar-
guing that the purpose of the article III protection is the preservation of the
court's subject matter jurisdiction, which cannot be waived by litigant con-
sent.8 3 Another argument suggested balance of power difficulties, in that the
magistrate would be acting like a district court judge but would not be ap-
pointed by the President nor approved by the Senate.
84
Judicial support for a consensual reference procedure appeared as early
as 1864 in Heckers v. Fowler.85 In Heckers, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the litigants' consent agreement to refer their case to a
referee whose report was to be filed with the clerk of the court and have the
81. See, e.g., DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 520 F.2d 499, 506-08 (1st
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976). For example, it has been argued that
consensual magistrate jury trials are constitutionally proper because, if parties may
waive their right to a trial by jury altogether, they may consent to a lesser form of
jury trial. See Sick v. City of Buffalo, 574 F.2d 689, 690 n.6 (2d Cir. 1978); Comment,
Article III Limts on Article I Courts.- The Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Court and the
1979 Magistrate Act, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 560 (1980); Comment, supra note 31, at 594.
82. S. REP. No. 74, supra note 7, at 5, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 1473.
83. 124 Cong. Rec. 33,546-47 (1978) (statement of Rep. Seiberling). According to
this view
the "judicial power" clause is a requirement of the Constitution which, in
effect, creates a right for society, for "the people," who have a legitimae
interest in the administration of justice and in the proper functioning of the
courts. . . .While an individual may waive his or her personal rights, the
individual may not waive the rights of the public or the requirements of the
Constitution including the "judicial power" clause.
Id. at 33,547.
84. Id. at 32,901 (statement of Rep. Drinan). Congressman Drinan reasoned as
follows:
Under this bill, the heretofore clear distinction between the functions of
magistrates and those of district judges would be lost. The magistrate
would preside over trials in a black robe in the same courtroom used by
article III judges; he would empanel juries, examine witnesses, make eviden-
tiary rulings, find facts, and enter judgments. He could even, in the Mar-
bury against Madison tradition, invalidate legislative or executive actions
which he found unconstitutional. This would debase our balance-of-powers
system, since a legislative or executive act could be nullified by a "judge"
who had not been appointed by the President or approved by the Senate.
Id.
85. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123 (1864). Heckers involved a breach of covenant concern-
ing the use of a patent. Id. While the case was pending, the parties agreed to refer it
to a "referee, to hear and determine the same, and all issues therein, with the same
powers as the court, and that an order be entered, making such reference; and that
the report of said referee have the same force and effect as a judgment of said court."
Id. The referee found the defendant liable for $9500 on which judgment was entered
and defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 124.
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same "force and effect as a judgment of the court."
'8 6
Similarly, in Kimberly v. Arms,8 7 the Court held that upon consent of the
parties, a master could hear the matter and report findings of fact and con-
clusions of law to the district judge, who was to accept the findings unless
clearly erroneous.88 On the basis of these precedents, several lower federal
courts have upheld consensual references to magistrates predating the Mag-
istrate Act of 1979 pursuant to the additional duties provision of the Federal
Magistrate Act of 1968.89
86. Id. at 127. The Court held that
a trial by arbitrators, appointed by the court, with the consent of both par-
ties, was one of the modes of prosecuting a suit of judgment as well estab-
lished and as fully warranted by law as a trial by jury trial, and, in the
judgment of this court, there can be no doubt to the correctness of that
proposition.
Id. at 128-29 (citing Alexandria Canal Co. v. Swann, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 89 (1847)).
87. 129 U.S. 512 (1889). Kimberly concerned the issue of whether certain busi-
ness profits belonged to an individual or the partnership. Id at 516. The partners
agreed to have the case referred to a master "to hear the evidence and decide all the
issues" between them. Id. The master found that Kimberly owned a one-half inter-
est from which Arms appealed. Id. at 512-22.
88. Id. at 524. The Court upheld the reference to the master, stating:
It is not within the general province of a master to pass upon all the issues
in an equity case, nor is it competent for the court to refer the entire deci-
sion of a case to him without the consent of the parties. . . .But when the
parties consent to the reference of a case to a master or other officer to hear
and decide all the issues therein, and report his findings, both of fact and of
law, and such reference is entered as a rule of the court, the master is
clothed with very different powers from those which he exercises upon ordi-
nary references, without such consent; and his determinations are not sub-
ject to be set aside and disregarded at the mere discretion of the court ...
Its findings, like those of an independent tribunal, are to be taken as pre-
sumptively correct, subject, indeed, to be reviewed under the reservation
contained in the consent and order of the court, when there has been mani-
fest error in the consideration given to the evidence, or in the application of
the law, but not otherwise.
Id.
89. See, e.g., Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1979); DeCosta v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting Sys., 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976);
Gelfgren v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 451 F. Supp. 1229 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
Muhich v. Allen concerned a civil action under 47 U.S.C. § 1983 for employment
discrimination. 603 F.2d at 1248. The parties consented to have the case referred to
a United States magistrate "for purposes of conducting all proceedings, including
trial and the entry of final judgment" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. Id. at 1249. Re-
jecting the constitutional challenge, the court held that the reference procedure em-
ployed in this case did not constitute a divestiture of the judicial power vested in
article III courts. Id. at 1251. The court ruled that jurisdiction "remains vested in
the district court and is merely exercised through the medium of the magistrate." d.
The Seventh Circuit could "find no constitutional infirmity where the litigants have
voluntarily and knowingly agreed to waive their right to a civil trial before an article
III judge." Id. In Muhich, the referral was based on 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3), which
provides that a magistrate may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsis-
tent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. Id. See 28 U.S.C.
§636(b)(3) (1982).
DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting System involved an action brought against a tele-
15
Phelan: The Constitutionality of the Federal Magistrate System after the
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
IV. APPLICATIONS OF NORTHERN PIPELINE TO THE MAGISTRATE
SYSTEM
A. Pacemaker I
Since the decision of Northern Pipeline, the constitutionality of the refer-
ence procedure has been directly addressed by both the Third and Ninth
Circuits. In 1983, in Pacemaker Diagnostic Cinic of America, Inc. v. Instromedix,
In., 9° the Ninth Circuit found the reference procedure of section 636(c) to
be unconstitutional since magistrates were performing the full range of du-
ties of an article III court while lacking the article III attributes of life tenure
vision network for alleged unauthorized use of a character concept which plaintiff
had developed, embodying a costume, slogan, name, and symbol. 520 F.2d at 502.
Pursuant to the stipulations of the parties, the case was referred to a magistrate pur-
suant to § 636(b). Id. at 503. When the reference was later contested by the plaintiff,
the First Circuit stated that
[flrom a constitutional view-point, we can see no significant difference be-
tween the arbitration and consensual reference for decision to magistrates.
In both situations the parties have freely and knowingly agreed to waive
their access to an Article III judge in the first instance . . . . Indeed, the
decision to waive in the case of a consensual reference is more knowledgea-
ble than in the case of an agreement to arbitrate a future dispute because it
is made after the issue has crystalized.
Id at 505. Furthermore, the court held that the "magistrate's findings being treated
as final, . . . are here subject to the same standard of review as are district court
findings under Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 52(a)." Id. at 514.
In Gefgren v. Republ'cNat'lLifeIns. Co., the plaintiff moved to vacate entry of the
judgment of the magistrate after trial by him pursuant to the parties' stipulations
using 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). 451 F. Supp. at 1229. The district court held that there
was "no constitutional inhibition to the reference made here any more than there
would be for the parties to choose binding arbitration. Nor is it constitutionally pro-
hibited that the Magistrate enter the judgment." Id.
See also Calderon v. Waco Lighthouse for the Blind, 630 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1980).
Calderon was an employment discrimination action under the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Id. at 353. A threshold issue was whether the employee had consented to a
referral since the district judge had informed the parties, sua sponte, that he was refer-
ring the case to a magistrate for trial on the merits. Id. The court held that the
appellant consented to the reference because he did not object to the reference before
his appeal. Id. at 354. The Fifth Circuit further held "that consensual references to a
magistrate for trial on the merits were permitted under section (b)(3) [28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(3)(1982)] independent of Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and subsection (b)(2)[28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2)(1982)] (permitting appointments of a
magistrate as a special master) even before the 1979 amendments to the statute." Id.
at 355. However, the court found that under this provision, the 1976 version of§ 636
required a de novo determination. Id.
90. 712 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc., brought an action against Instromedix,
Inc. for patent infringement. Id. at 1306. Pursuant to the Federal Magistrate Act of
1979, the parties consented to have the case tried before the magistrate sitting with-
out a jury. Id at 1307. For the text of § 636(c) of the Federal Magistrate Act, see
note 11 supra. The magistrate found the patent valid but not infringed, and both
parties appealed to the circuit court. 712 F.2d at 1307. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that § 636(c) was unconstitutional.
Id. at 1313.
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and freedom from salary diminution. 9 1
The court, after finding that magistrates were not article III judges,
looked into possible exceptions to the article III requirements as presented in
Northern Pipehhne. The Ninth Circuit found that the magistrate system did not
qualify as a legislative court since
Congress may only establish separate courts in a limited class of
cases "in which the grant of power to the Legislative and Executive
branches . . .[is] so exceptional that the congressional assertion of
a power to create legislative courts was consistent with, rather than
threatening to, the constitutional mandate of separation of
powers."
92
The court further found that the magistrate did not qualify as an adjunct to
the district court because the 1979 Act permitted the magistrate to enter
final judgment which would violate the requirement that "the authority-
and the responsibility-to make an informed, final determination" remain
with the district court judge.
93
An argument was presented that there was no threat to the separation
of powers, because litigants and judges, both within the judicial branch, and
not Congress or the President, decide whether cases may be referred to a
magistrate. The Pacemaker court circumvented this argument by expanding
the notion of separation of powers to include freedom from undue influence
within the judicial branch itself.
94
The court recognized that the most persuasive argument in favor of the
constitutionality of section 636(c) is the requirement for litigant consent. 95
In response, the Ninth Court stated that "[n]o case squarely holds that liti-
gant consent will solve the constitutional problems." 96 The panel distin-
guished Heckers v. Fowler, where the litigants agreed that the referee's report
was to have the same binding effect as a judgment of the court, by stating
that the report was still required to be reviewed and accepted by the district
court.
9 7
Rejecting a proferred analogy to arbitration, the Pacemaker court found
that enforcement of an arbiter's decision stems from the parties' contractual
agreement to abide by the decision, that judicial review on the merits is now
allowed, and that judgment cannot be entered by the arbiter.
98
The panel refuted the argument that the right to an article III judge is a
due process right, for the benefit of the litigants, and therefore waivable as
91. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Ferguson, Boochever, and Norris.
Judge Boochever delivered the opinion for the unanimous panel.
92. 712 F.2d at 1309 (quoting Northern Pipelne, 458 U.S. at 64).
93. Id. at 1310 (citing Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 682).
94. Id. at 1312-13.
95. Id. at 1310.
96. Id. at 1311.
97. Id. n.12.
98. Id. at 1311.
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with any due process right.99 Instead, the panel suggested that the require-
ment of an article III judge was similar to subject matter jurisdiction in that
it was meant to be part of the framework of government and, hence, not
waivable. 00
The panel also discussed the argument that appellate review by an arti-
cle III judge satisfies article III requirements.' 0 1 Relying on Northern Pipelne,
the Ninth Circuit panel held that "the text of article III and the Court's
'precedents make it clear that the constitutional requirements for the exer-
cise of judicial power must be met at all stages of adjudication, and not only
on appeal.' "102
B. Wharton-Thomas v. United States
After the Ninth Circuit's original decision in Pacemaker, the Third Cir-
cuit found section 636(c) of the Magistrate Act to be constitutional in Whar-
ton- Thomas v. United States.
10 3
Wharton-Thomas involved a claim for damages under the Federal Tort
Claim Act, for injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile collision with a
Post Office jeep.10 4 With the consent of the parties, the case was tried before
a federal magistrate pursuant to section 636(c) of the Magistrate Act.' 0 5
The magistrate entered judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of
$7,500.106 The plaintiff appealed, claiming that the award was inadequate
and that the magistrate's finding was clearly erroneous.1 0 7 Since the original
Pacemaker decision characterized the right of magistrates to enter judgment
upon the consent of the parties as one of jurisdiction, the Third Circuit
raised the issue sua sponte.1
0 8
99. Id. at 1312.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1313.
102. Id. (quoting Northern Ppeline, 458 U.S. at 86 n.39 (plurality opinion)).
103. 721 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1983). The case was heard by Circuit Judges Weis,
Higginbotham, and Sloviter. Judge Weis delivered the opinion for a unanimous
court.
104. Id. at 923. The plaintiff was injured in two automobile accidents within
the span of five months. Id. The first was a minor collision between the plaintiff's
station wagon and the Post Officejeep. Id. Five months later, the plaintiff was again
injured in a chain reaction accident involving four cars. Id.
The United States did not seriously contest liability for the collision with the
Post Office jeep, but contended that the more serious second accident caused most of
the plaintiff's injuries. Id.
105. Id at 924. For the text of § 636(c), see note 11 supra.
106. Id. at 923.
107. Id. at 924.
108. Id at 925. The court first had to confront whether it was presented with an
appealable order. Id. at 924. While § 636(c)(3) permits an appeal directly to the
court of appeals in a case tried by consent, § 636(c)(4) allows the parties, prior to
trial, to consent to have any appeals go before the district judge. Id. The parties in
Wharton-Thomas consented to the latter procedure, but, according to counsel for both
parties, did so erroneously. Id Because the procedure was new, the Third Circuit
granted the parties' request to set aside the consent to bypass to the district judge. Id
[Vol. 29: p. 745
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The Third Circuit identified litigant consent as the vital distinction be-
tween the decision in Northern Pipeine, regarding the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, and the constitutionality of section 636(c) of the Magistrate Act.10 9
The court characterized the Northern Peline holding as being that a
"traditional" state common-law action, not made subject to a fed-
eral rule of decision, and related only peripherally to an adjudica-
tion of bankruptcy under federal law, must, absent the consent of the
litigants, be heard by an "Article III court" if it is to be heard by
any court or agency of the United States."10
The Third Circuit further found that the "parties' consent went not to
the jurisdiction of the district court as an entity, but to the judicial officer
within the court who conducted the trial" and "[w]aiver of a particular
mode of trial or factfinder is not unknown."' Hence, consent to a trial by
a magistrate was likened to a waiver of a jury trial.' 12
After finding that consent distinguished the magistrate system from the
bankruptcy court system, the court further distinguished the two by finding
that the magistrate was an actual adjunct to the district court. 1 3 The court
noted that in the bankruptcy system, cases were not referred by the district
court but were filed directly in the bankruptcy court. 1 4 Furthermore, the
district court in the bankruptcy system could not terminate references.' 15 In
contrast, the Third Circuit found that the magistrate is "truly a part of the
district court, appointed by its judges and subject to dismissal by them." '" 16
Moreover, cases heard by a magistrate must be referred and can be vacated
by the district judge.' 
1 7
The Third Circuit did not accept the argument proferred by the Ninth
109. Id at 925-26.
110. Id. at 926 (citing Northern PFielthe (Burger, C.J., dissenting)) (emphasis sup-
plied by the Third Circuit).
111. Id. at 926. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) (1982). For the text of § 636(c)(2), see
note 11 supra.
112. 721 F.2d at 926. The Third Circuit stated that waiver of a particular mode
of trial or factfinder has long standing recognition and gave, as examples, rule 38(d),
which provides for an automatic waiver of a jury trial if a timely request is not made,
and rule 39(c), which allows the district judge, with the consent of the parties, to
order a jury trial not otherwise triable by right. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 38(d),
39(c)).
113. Id. at 927.
114. Id. at 926-27. The court recognized that the bankruptcy judges are in-
dependent of the district court since under the new Reform Act they would be ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. (citing 28
U.S.C. § 152 (1982)). Moreover, cases are filed directly in the bankruptcy court. Id.
115. Id. at 927.
116. Id.
117. Id. The Third Circuit held that the "magistrate does not function indepen-
dently of the district court, but as an integral part of it." Id.
It is interesting to note that during the Senate Hearings on the Federal Magis-
trate Act of 1979 (before the decision in Northern Pzt'ehe), proponents of the Act's
constitutionality urged a comparison of the magistrate's duties with those of bank-
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Circuit panel in the original Pacemaker decision that the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers should be extended to include conflicts within the judicial
branch.""8 Instead, the court noted that when a magistrate is assigned cases
for hearing and recommendation, his work must be reviewed and approved
by the district judge before becoming final'1 9 which is the "ultimate in influ-
encing the decision." The court then noted that the Supreme Court has
found such procedures to the constitutional.1
2 0
In sum, the Third Circuit found that section 636(c) does not violate
article III because:
1. The reference to a magistrate is consensual;
2. The district judge has the power to vacate a reference;
3. The magistrate is appointed by the district judges, is a
part of the district court, and is specially designated to try cases;
and
4. The parties have a right of appeal to a district judge or the
court of appeals. 121
C. Pacemaker II
After the Third Circuit's decision in Wharton-Thomas, the Ninth Circuit,
sitting en banc, reviewed and reversed its original Pacemaker decision. 122 The
Ninth Circuit held that "in light of the statutory precondition of voluntary
ruptcy judges. See Hearngs on S 3475 before the Subcomm. on Improvements in theJudicial
Machiheg of the Senate Comm. on theJudc iary, 95 Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1977).
118. 721 F.2d at 927 n.8. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's analysis of
separation of powers in the first Pacemaker decision, see note 94 supra.
119. 721 F.2d at 927 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1982)).
120. Id. The Third Circuit recognized that in Raddatz, Weber, and Northern Pipe-
hne, where the Supreme Court emphasized that final decision making authority must
rest in an article III court, the reference was not consensual but was forced upon the
parties. Id. at 928. For a discussion of Raddatz, see notes 57-59 and accompanying
text supra. For a discussion of Weber, see notes 54-56 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of Northern Pipeline, see notes 61-77 and accompanying text supra.
The Third Circuit cited Heckers, in which "[t]he Supreme Court held that the
reference was valid because it 'does not directly involve the question of jurisdiction,
but has respect to the mode of trial as substituting the report of the referee for the
verdict of the jury . . . .Practice of referring pending actions is coeval with the
organization of our judicial system.' " 721 F.2d at 928 (quoting Heckers, 69 U.S. (2
Wall.) at 128). For a discussion of Heckers, see notes 85-86 and accompanying text
supra.
The Third Circuit disagreed with the distinction made by the Ninth Circuit
panel in Pacemaker that the report of award must be "accepted or confirmed by the
court" stating that "the very point of Heckers is that, because of the agreement of the
parties, the judgment was valid even though an Article III judge did not review and
accept the report." 721 F.2d at 929.
121. 721 F.2d at 930. Another panel of the Third Circuit has adopted the ra-
tionale of Wharton-Thomas to hold § 636(c) constitutional. See Williams v. Mus-
somelli, 722 F.2d 1130 (3d Cir. 1983).
122. Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d
537, 540 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc). The en banc appeal was heard by Chief Judge
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litigant consent and the provisions for the appointment and control of the
magistrates by Article III courts, the conduct of civil trials by magistrates is
constitutional."'
' 23
The court observed that separation of powers protections, in some cases,
have two components.1 24 "One axis reaches to the person affected by gov-
ernment action and encompasses his or her relation to a constitutional
branch; the other axis runs from each governmental branch to the others to
insure separation and independence in the constitutional structure."' 125 The
court found that the personal right to an article III judge may be waived
12 6
but stated that the "purported waiver of the right to an Article III trial
would not be an acceptable ground for avoiding the constitutional question
if the alternative to the waiver were the imposition of serious burdens and
costs on the litigant."'
2 7
In overcoming the second axis of the separation of powers protections,
the court held:
Upon examination of the statute before us, we conclude that it con-
tains sufficient protection against the erosion of judicial power to
overcome the constitutional objections leveled against it. The stat-
ute invests the Article III judiciary with extensive administrative
control over the management, composition, and operation of the
magistrate system. It permits, moreover, control over specific cases
by the resumption of district court jurisdiction on the court's own
initiative.128
Browning and Judges Sneed, Kennedy, Tang, Schroeder, Farris, Pregerson, Alarcon,
Poole, Nelson, and Canby.
123. Id
124. Id at 541.
125. Id
126. Id. at 542. The court stated that the "independent character of federal
adjudication under Article III imports to a judgment qualities of authority and re-
spect that are well understood. It follows that the federal litigant has a personal
right, subject to exceptions in certain classes of cases, to demand Article III adjudica-
tion of a civil suit." Id at 541.
The court further noted that in recent cases the Supreme Court has not had to
consider the constitutional implications of consent by the parties to go before a non-
article III judge, because in none did all parties consent to the procedure. Id at 542
(citing Northern Pipehe, 458 U.S. 50 (1982); Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); Palmore v.
United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973), Glidden, 370 U.S. 530 (1962)). The court, how-
ever, found that the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline indicated that consent is im-
portant to the constitutional analysis. 725 F.2d at 542.
The en banc court also gave considerable weight to the judgment of Congress that
consent of the parties eliminates constitutional objections. Id. The court noted that
the House Committee gave explicit consideration to the issue of constitutionality and
concluded that the consent of the parties suffices to overcome objections on constitu-
tional grounds. Id.
127. Id. at 543.
128. Id. at 544. The court further stated that
[tihe power to cancel a reference, taken together with the retention by Arti-
cle III judges of the power to designate magistrate positions and to select
1983-84]
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The dissent of Judge Schroeder, with whom Judges Pregerson and
Canby joined, emphasized the need to insure an independent judiciary.
129
The dissent stated that:
[Northern Pipeline] thus extends the line of cases beginning with
Crowell and continuing through Raddatz which, while containing
many differences, are all connected by one critical theme: Con-
gress may not delegate away power that properly belongs in the
hands of Article III judges. When the power taken from the Article
III courts is the power to make final decisions in any type of civil
case, as in the Magistrates Act, the reasoning of all these decisions
leads me inescapably to the conclusion that the Constitution has
been violated. '
3 0
V. WHARTON-THOMAS AND PACEMAKER II. THE BET-TER VIEW
In reviewing the decisions in Wharton-Thomas and Pacemaker, it is submit-
ted that the Third and Ninth circuits properly found section 636(c) of the
Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 to be constitutional. 13 1 The requirement
that the reference be consensual, together with the fact that magistrates work
and remove individual magistrates, provides Article III courts with continu-
ing, plenary responsibility for the administration of the judicial business of
the United States. This responsibility sufficiently protects the judiciary
from the encroachment of other branches to satisfy the separation of powers
embodied in Article III.
Id. at 546.
129. Id. at 547 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 552 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). The dissent further discussed the
need for independence within the judiciary by stating that "[s]trong voices have ar-
gued that under our Constitution, no judge should be accountable to any other
judge." Id.
Moreover, the dissent argued that consent was but an illusion since economic
burdens and pressure from district courts wishing to reduce their crowded dockets
would eliminate any real choice in the reference. Id. at 553-54 (Schroeder, J.,
dissenting).
131. See Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512 (1889); Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2
Wall.) 123 (1864). The Ninth Circuit originally distinguished these cases, which al-
lowed consensual reference, by making a very fine distinction as to who enters final
judgment. Pacemaker, 712 F.2d at 1310-11. For the Ninth Circuit's original discussion
of the authority to enter final judgment, see note 90 supra. In Kimberly, the Supreme
Court held that review of a decision by a master who was to hear all the evidence and
decide all the issues was only by application of the clearly erroneous standard. 129
U.S. at 524. For a discussion of Kmberly, see notes 87-89 and accompanying text
supra. In Heckers, the Supreme Court allowed a consensual reference whereby the
parties agreed that the report of the referee would have the same force and effect as
the judgment of the court. 69 U.S. at 123. It is submitted that since the Supreme
Court allowed such removals from the district court upon consensual reference and
further required that the review be limited to the clearly erroneous standard, it
makes little difference if the decision is formally entered by the district court. For a
discussion of Heckers, see notes 85-86 and accompanying text supra.
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within the Article III judiciary, provides the needed protection against dis-
rupting the separation of powers.
DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting System provides an example of a district
court allowing magistrates to conduct entire trials before the 1979 amend-
ments to the Magistrate Act. '3 2 In DeCosla, the court had no difficulty find-
ing a consensual reference to be constitutional.' 33 The court's greatest
concern was the degree of review required for conclusions of law: it stated
that "[u]ntil Congress ...fashions a review procedure for consensual refer-
ence for final (or semi-final) determination of all issues of law and fact, it
might be better to rely on the formulation contained in Rule 53(e)(4)."'
34
The court's decision to require a district court to review objections to a mag-
istrate's decision on the law, therefore, was based on statutory analysis and
not on constitutional prohibitions.
1 35
The Seventh Circuit expanded on this view in Muhich v. Allen.136 In
Muhich, the court stated that "we find no constitutional infirmity where the
litigants have voluntarily and knowingly agreed to waive their right to a civil
trial before an article III judge."'
37
In addition to the decisions cited, support for the consensual reference
procedure could be gained through rule 53(e)(4) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. This rule allows litigants to consent to having a master
make a final determination of the facts.' 3 8 Moreover, rule 52(a) states that
"findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered the findings of the court."' 139 Reading rule 53(e)(4) with rule
52(a), a master is, in effect, entering the findings of the court as to the facts
when the parties so consent.
These federal rules indicate that the right to have an article III judge to
determine the facts is waivable. In such a situation, if only the facts are
contested, the magistrate would be making the final decision for the court.
It follows logically that parties should be able to consent to having a magis-
trate determine questions of law.
Further support for the consensual reference procedure arises in the
analogous procedure of arbitration which has been long recognized as a
means of "private" dispute resolution that removes disputes from the district
courts. 140 The primary distinction from arbitration and consensual refer-
132. 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. demed, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
133. Id at 507-08.
134. Id at 508.
135. For a discussion of DeCosta, see note 89 supra.
136. 603 F.2d 1247.
137. Id at 1251. For a discussion of Muhich, see note 89 supra.
138. Rule 53(e)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[t]he ef-
fect of a master's report is the same whether or not the parties have consented to the
reference; but, when the parties stipulate that a master's findings of fact shall be final,
only questions of law arising from the report shall thereafter be considered." FED. R.
Civ. P. 53(e)(4).
139. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
140. See Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, 128-29 (1864); Burchell v.
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ence is that an arbitration order can be reversed only on very limited
grounds. 14 1 Moreover, arbiters need not adhere to court procedure, 14 2 the
rules of evidence, 143 or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 144 If the Con-
stitution allows parties to reconcile their disputes by consenting to arbitra-
tion and doing without legal procedural protections, then it certainly should
allow consensual reference to magistrates. 145
It is further submitted that there should be no difference between waiv-
ing the right to an article III judge and waiving other guaranteed due pro-
cess rights. Article III, section 1 has two important components. The first
sentence creates the framework of our judicial system by designating a
Supreme Court and what lower courts Congress may establish."46 The sec-
ond sentence pertains to life tenure judges whose salary can not be dimin-
ished. 14 7 While the first sentence provides the framework of the judicial
Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344 (1854); Butler Prod. Co. v. Unistrut Corp., 367 F.2d
733 (7th Cir. 1966).
141. See Comment, supra note 31, at 592 n.54. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 10 (1982), provides that an award may be vacated only when procured by
corruption, fraud, or undue means; where the arbiters were obviously prejudiced;
where the arbiters engaged in misconduct prejudical to the rights of the parties; or
where the arbiter exceeded or imperfectly executed their powers so that a proper
award was not made. Id.
142. See Compania Panemena Maritima San Gerassimo, S.A. v. J.E. Hurley
Lumber Co., 244 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1957) (parties who adopt arbitration may not
insist on legal formalities); American Almond Prod. Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales
Co., 144 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1944) (parties adopting arbitration must accept the infor-
malities associated therewith).
143. See Petroleum Separating Co. v. Interamerican Refining Corp., 296 F.2d
124 (2d Cir. 1961) (arbiter may consider hearsay evidence).
144. See Foremost Yearn Mills, Inc. v. Rose Mills, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 9 (E.D. Pa.
1960).
145. In the original Pacemaker decision the court found that arbitration is not
analogous to consensual reference since the former does not "invoke the judicial
power of the United States courts." 712 F.2d at 1311. The court reasoned that en-
forcement of an arbitration decision is done through a contractual obligation, not
from an exercise of judicial power. Id. While this distinction may invite interesting
conceptual discussions, it is submitted that the effect of both systems is virtually
identical.
146. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1. It is interesting to note that Congress did not
have to establish inferior courts, thereby leaving initial action to non-article III state
courts with appeal to the Supreme Court. The protection of life tenured judges
would, thus, not come until the appeal was brought, whether or not the parties
consented.
147. Id The second sentence of article III, § 1 ensures the separation of powers
and protects the independence of the judiciary by providing that the "Judges, both of
the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office." Id. The Framers believed this pro-
vision to be very important and stated that "[n]ext to permanency in office, nothing
can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for
their support . . . . In the general course of human nature a power over a man's subsis-
lance amounts to a power over his wil." THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 491 (A. Hamilton)
(H. Lodge ed. 1888) (emphasis in original). The life tenure and salary requirement
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system, the second sentence is to ensure impartiality and fairness on the part
of federal judges. Since impartiality and fairness are the basis of all due
process rights, trial by an article III judge should be waivable as with other
due process rights.
148
It must be emphasized, however, that the constitutional saving provi-
sion is the requirement that the reference be consensual.' 49 The Third Cir-
cuit's holding that the magistrates are "adjuncts" to the district court should
not be interpreted to allow dispositive jurisdiction absent the consent of the
parties.' 5 0 Furthermore, to ensure the consensual nature of the reference, a
balance must be struck between the availability of magistrates and district
court judges to ensure that a real choice exists.'
51
The validity of the magistrate system is of enormous importance, as
thousands of cases are being tried across the country by magistrates with the
consent of the parties. 152 The magistrate system promotes judicial economy
by allowing less difficult legal issues to be referred to magistrates, freeing the
district court to tackle more difficult legal issues. The parties and society as
a whole benefit from the more expedient resolution of their disputes. A mag-
were, therefore, included in article III, § 1 as an assurance of impartiality and inde-
pendence of decision from the legislative branch-to increase the chance for fairness.
148. See Shick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 72 (1904) ("[wlhen there is no
constitutional or statutory mandate, and no public policy prohibiting, an accused
may waive any privilege which he is given the right to enjoy"). See also Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (waiver of right to counsel); Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514 (1972) (waiver of right to a speedy trial); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1
(1966) (waiver of right to cross examine witnesses); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938) (waiver of right to counsel); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930)
(waiver of right to trial by jury); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (waiver of right to trial by
pleading guilty).
149. Without a consensual reference, it is submitted that the magistrate's judg-
ment would run afoul of the requirement that the final decision-making step rest in
an article III judge when forced upon the parties. See, e.g., Raddatz Weber- Northern
Pipehe. For a discussion of Weber, see notes 54-56 and accompanying text supra. For
a discussion of Northern tpeh'ne, see notes 61-74 and accompanying text supra.
150. The Third Circuit emphasized that magistrates are "adjuncts" to the dis-
trict court. Wharton-Thomas, 721 F.2d at 927. An expansion of this reasoning would
allow Congress to empower magistrates to try cases absent the consent of the parties.
The Third Circuit, however, used its reasoning in the context of an entirely con-
sensual procedure. See id The importance of internal delegation was listed as one of
four factors assuring the constitutionality of § 636(c), but was listed after the require-
ment that the reference be consensual. Id. at 930.
151. Any delay or inconvenience caused by not consenting to a magistrate can
be considered an economic cost. These costs must not amount to such a penalty that
it greatly influences a litigant's decision. If a litigant cannot afford the cost of delay
and is in effect forced to consent to a magistrate when he would prefer a district
judge, there is a lack of meaningful choice. See Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 543.
152. According to figures provided by the Department of Justice, federal magis-
trates terminated 262 jury and 563 nonjury trials with the consent of the parties in
the year ending June 30, 1982. Pacemaker, 712 F.2d at 1313 n.18. Magistrates also
terminated 1627 consent cases without trial. Id. (citing the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, Consent Cases Terminated by U.S. Magistrates - year
ended June 30, 1982).
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istrate may be hired for only one term in order to eliminate presently ex-
isting congestion without the long term burdens imposed by tenured judges
who may be unnecessary after the congestion is relieved. The removal of the
consent procedure would mean a lessening of the judicial system's flexibility
and effectiveness.
VII. CONCLUSION
The procedure allowing a magistrate, upon consent of the parties, to
conduct entire civil trials and enter final judgment is a constitutional inno-
vation providing economy and flexibility to the federal judicial system. The
constitutionality of the system rests upon the knowing and intelligent waiver
of the due process right to an article III judge. This waiver, however, re-
quires that no pressure, either tacit or express, be exerted upon the litigants
to force a reference to a magistrate and, hence, close judicial scrutiny is
needed to assure this end.
Kenneth J Phelan
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